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Abstract
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 included a substantial economic development effort known as Opportunity Zones. These Zones cover 12% of the
census tracts in the United States and are estimated to cost $1.6 billion in lost
capital gains tax revenue. Our paper seeks to find whether this program has
had an impact four years after going into effect, using an econometric analysis
on changes in housing prices.
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1

Introduction

When the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was signed into law in December 2017, the
bill included a substantial economic development effort: the creation of taxdeferrable investment zones. These zones, known as Qualified Opportunity
Zones, were then designated by governors in each state to target economically
distressed census tracts. Opportunity Zones (OZ) were intended to incentivize
economic growth and job creation by providing tax benefits to investors who
reinvest capital gains into designated Zones between 2018 and 2026.
After the bill was signed, state governors were tasked with selecting up to 25
percent of eligible census tracts within their state, at which point the Treasury
Secretary had 30 days to certify the selected Opportunity Zones. To be eligible
for OZ designation, a census tract had to meet the following requirements as
either a low-income community (LIC) or contiguous census tract:
• A LIC is defined in the legislation as:
– Having a minimum poverty rate of 20 percent.
– And a median family income of:
∗ No more than 80 percent of the statewide median family income
for census tracts within non-metropolitan areas.
∗ No more than 80 percent of the greater statewide median family
income or the overall metropolitan median family income for
census tracts within metropolitan areas.
• To be considered as a tract that is contiguous with a census tract that
meets the above criteria, the contiguous tract needed to have a median
family income of no more than 125% of the neighboring eligible tract.
By the second quarter of 2018, just under 8,800 tracts (approximately 12 percent
of all census tracts in the US) had been designated. With such a large number of
communities designated to attract new investments, this place-based economic
development initiative is much more significant in scope than similar programs
that have been implemented in the past such as Federal Empowerment Zones
that were established under the Clinton Administration in 1993.
It is critical to examine the effects of a program of such magnitude. Our
paper uses a single-family house pricing index to analyze the impact of Opportunity Zone designation. The primary dataset for our analysis was released
through the Federal Housing Finance Agency and allows us to examine the
short-term impact of Opportunity Zone designation on single-family house price
growth.
We use a difference-in-difference empirical analysis to study the effect of Zone
designation on residential housing prices. Particularly, we compare tracts that
qualified as LIC and were designated by governors to tracts that similarly qualified as LIC, but were not designated by governors. The difference-in-difference
framework allows us to account for idiosyncratic shocks that had uniform effects
across census tracts. Thus, common nationwide shocks, such as the Covid-19
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pandemic, are controlled for through the control group. To address the concern
that designated LIC tracts differed significantly from non-designated LIC tracts,
we also employ a matching difference-in-difference estimator where we use pretreatment observables to create a propensity score of being designated. For each
designated LIC census tract, we use a nearest-neighbor matching procedure in
a difference-in-difference design.
Our paper follows prior work of Chen et al. (2022) who found no impact on
housing price growth in 2018 (immediately after zones were designated). Our
paper extends the analysis through 2021. Thus, we are able to analyze not just
the initial impact of Zone designation on housing prices, but whether OZ have
impacted prices over the past four years. Similar to Chen (2019), we find no
evidence that Zone designation had a positive effect on house prices in 2018.
Furthermore, as we extend the analysis through 2021, we continue to find no
positive effect of Opportunity Zones on residential housing prices.

2

Significance of Opportunity Zones

While place-based policies have been implemented before, the Opportunity Zone
designation through the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is the largest in terms of
scale since Empowerment Zones were authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Chen 2019). With 8,762 of the 74,134 tracts in the United
States and its territories designated, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
that Opportunity Zones will cost $1.6 billion in lost capital gains tax revenue
between 2018 and 2027. The massive scale at which the OZ program is being
implemented and the expected cost make it crucial to determine whether this
policy has had a measurable impact and inform future economic development
efforts accordingly.
Because the deferred gains for Opportunity Zone investments become more
beneficial to investors over time, we expect to see an immediate influx of investments into - and thus immediate impacts on - Opportunity Zones in order
to maximize the tax savings. In fact, a report from the Council of Economic
Advisors estimates that capital raised in Qualified Opportunity Funds is $75
billion as of August 2020, $52 billion of which is estimated to be considered new
investments which would not have been brought to the designated census tracts
otherwise. The maximum deferred gains benefit is available after only 10 years,
so the effects of the Opportunity Zones program in the first years are likely a
strong indicator of the total effect of the program will have.
Since the creation of Opportunity Zones, much of the prior literature surrounding them has focused on the political economy involved in designating the
Zones. Because the Zones were designated by the state’s governors directly,
there was an opportunity for them to use Zone designation to grant political
favors and buy voter support. Analyses in this area have investigated whether
or not there is evidence that governors had these ulterior motives in mind when
selecting which Opportunity Zones were to be designated. Frank et al. (2022)
finds that political economy did play a role and that tracts with the same polit-
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ical affiliation as the governor in their state were more likely to be designated.
Alm et al. (2021) found that the selection process for Zones to be designated
seemed to be relatively technocratic. Their paper determined that the selections
with governors made were primarily influenced by economic wellness indicators
such as unemployment and median household income. However, Alm et al.
(2021) also mentioned that there may have been some political influence, finding that tracts with elected officials of the same political party as the state’s
governor were slightly more likely to be designated than those without.
Regardless of the mechanics behind how Zones were designated, it is important to determine their impact. Prior literature on the impacts of Opportunity Zones is still relatively scarce given how recently Zones were designated,
but many studies have been done to analyze the success of similar previous
place-based economics development programs such as the aforementioned Federal Empowerment Zones created by the Clinton Administration in 1993. The
results from the work done on these previous programs are largely mixed: Ham
et al. (2011) found positive impacts on the local labor markets as a result
of Federal Empowerment Zones, Federal Enterprise Community programs, and
State Enterprise Zones. Their paper concluded that there were improvements
in the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and employment. Neumark and Young
(2019), however, found that the positive effects noted in Ham et al. (2011) were
not due to the programs themselves but rather the fact that the communities
selected had already been seeing improvements in their poverty rates and other
labor market outcomes. The paper concluded that once this selection bias is
taken into account, Empowerment Zones were largely ineffective. Harger and
Ross (2016) looked into the New Markets Tax Credit program - which is a federal program established in 2000 that provided tax credits to draw investment
dollars into historically low-income communities - and found positive and negative labor market effects, depending on industry, as a result. Much of this
literature focuses in on the impacts of standard economic indicators such as
poverty rates and employment whereas additional literature seeks to better understand the impact that programs of this kind have on the people living in the
treated communities.
It is important to consider that place based economic development policies
are intended to do more than simply boost the labor market or decrease the
poverty rate – the real goal is to use these measures as a way of improving the
quality of life for the people living in economically distressed areas by providing
them with more opportunity. Oakley & Tsao (2016) used Census data to look
at the socioeconomic impact of the Empowerment Zones put in place in 1993
and found that most of the attracted funding went to traditional economic
development initiatives rather than community building and involvement. As
a result, the treated areas saw little to no increase in socioeconomic outcomes
when compared to untreated census tracts. Krupka et al. (2009) also attempted
to separate these direct and indirect effects. Their analysis found that while the
policy did in fact increase house prices for the targeted census blocks, indirect
measures of neighborhood quality such as the neighborhood’s demographics or
housing stock saw very small, or in some cases even negative, effects. This
5

result, they argue, goes against the economic theory that quality of life and
house prices improve simultaneously – a theory that proponents of place based
economic development programs seem to rely on.
Our paper contributes to the literature on place based economic development
policies and, more specifically, a growing pool of analysis on the short-term
impacts of Opportunity Zone designation. Sage et al. (2021) found that Zone
designation did not impact property prices in general, but there was positive
growth in value for vacant land and properties with renovation requirements in
designated tracts. Chen (2019) looks at single family home prices and finds that
prices of homes in designated Zones saw very little or no change following Zone
designation.
Both of these papers include, at most, one year of post-treatment data. With
such a short amount of time after the policy took effect, it is not surprising to
find that the initial results are largely null. Our paper builds on this research
with four full years of post-treatment data to get a clearer picture of the shortterm effect of Zone designation on single family house prices.
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Data

The data used in this paper are sourced from the Urban Institutes’ Tract Level
Opportunity Zone Analysis and the Census Tract House Pricing Index from
the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Census tracts in each individual dataset
are correlated with a specific geographic identifier, known as a GEOID. The
two datasets were merged using the GEOID’s of specific designated and nondesignated census tracts.
The initial dataset used in this analysis was collected from the Urban Institute, a non-profit Washington D.C. think-tank that produces economic and
social research about American communities. The dataset includes information
on all eligible tracts in the United States as well as in Washington, D.C., Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, as gathered from the 2010 Census and IRS data on Opportunity Zones. The variables
included in this dataset give a picture of a Census tract’s economic health, capturing things such as median household income, poverty rate, unemployment
rate, median house value, etc. Additionally, the data captures demographic
information of the residents in each community such as education levels, race,
and age. Lastly, the Urban Institute includes a binary variable that takes the
value of 1 if the tract was selected to be an Opportunity Zone. For our analysis,
this dataset was used primarily to identify the GEOIDs of designated and nondesignated tracts and to see how the demographic characteristics differ between
designated and eligible but non-designated zones. Although this information
is also available publicly from the U.S. IRS and Census websites, the Urban
Institute cleaned and compiled the data into an easy-to-use format which was
very helpful for our research.
To analyze the effect of Zone designation on single-family house prices, we
use the Census Tract House Pricing Index (HPI) from the Federal Housing
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Table 1: Summary of Percent Change in HPI Pre- and Post-Treatment

PreObservations
PostObservations

All

Designated

Non-Desig.

Matched Non-Desig.

6.638
(8.113)
36258
7.948
(7.090)
48344

6.607
(8.599)
7290
8.055
(7.301)
9720

6.646
(7.987)
28968
7.921
(7.035)
38624

6.198
(8.536)
7281
7.847
(7.138)
9708

Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses.

Finance Agency. This data uses repeat mortgage transactions to compile an
index for each census tract in the United States that captures changes in singlefamily house prices going back as far as 1975. The data used in our analysis
is a subset of the entire Census Tract HPI dataset that is limited to eligible
(designated and non-designated) census tracts. Additionally, because the HPI
data has become more complete with each passing year, we focus on years 2014
through 2021 (the most current year of data at the time of our analysis) to be
sure that we have enough data to establish pre-treatment trends while at the
same time being careful to keep the data as complete as possible. An earlier
version of this dataset was used in Chen (2019) to look at immediate short-term
effects of Opportunity Zone designation on single-family home prices, and our
analysis builds on that research with two additional years of post-treatment
data.
Our analysis focuses on the effects of Zone designation in the 50 United
States and Washington DC, so data pertaining to tracts in other territories was
not used. Additionally, we only include only tracts that were eligible for Opportunity Zone designation due to their classification as low-income communities
(LIC’s). The data also included contiguous non-LIC tracts, which were eligible
for Opportunity Zone designation if the median household income in the tract
does not exceed 125% of the bordering low-income community. These non-LIC
contiguous tracts were excluded from our analysis because less than 3% of the
tracts eligible under this condition were chosen to be designated as opportunity
zones (as compared to 27% for tracts classified as LIC) and they were likely to
vary significantly from LIC tracts in terms of demographic and economic characteristics, making it difficult to establish a reliable control group. Finally, to
ensure that our analysis was using a balanced panel, we included only census
tracts which had complete data for each of the years 2014 through 2021. This
left us with around 12,000 census tracts, observed annually over a period of 8
years, to be used for our analysis on the short-term impact of Opportunity Zone
designation on single family house prices.
Table 1 includes the summary statistics for the primary variable of interest
in our analysis: the percent change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s
7

Table 2: Summary of Tract Characteristics

Median Household Income
Median Home Value
Median Rent
Percent Under Severe Rent Burden
Poverty Rate
Unemployment Rate
Percent White
Percent with BA or Higher
Percent Over 64
Observations

All

Designated

Non-Desig.

Matched Non-Desig.

43,594.7
(10,855.1)
174,517.2
(106,136.1)
897.4
(257.0)
26.1
(10.5)
21.4
(8.7)
9.3
(4.4)
55.4
(29.4)
20.4
(12.0)
13.8
(6.3)
12086

40,254.7
(10,467.5)
165,824.2
(98,889.6)
848.4
(239.4)
26.8
(10.5)
24.2
(9.6)
10.1
(5.1)
55.2
(30.0)
19.1
(10.7)
13.8
(6.1)
2430

44,435.2
(10,789.4)
176,707.4
(107,779.4)
909.8
(259.8)
26.0
(10.5)
20.7
(8.4)
9.1
(4.1)
55.5
(29.2)
20.7
(12.3)
13.8
(6.4)
9656

43,227.5
(10,589.7)
165,222.6
(98,238.8)
873.0
(249.4)
25.9
(10.5)
21.4
(8.8)
9.2
(4.3)
59.7
(28.4)
21.3
(12.8)
14.2
(6.6)
2427

Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses.

House Price Index (HPI). The statistics are shown pre- and post-treatment for
designated tracts, eligible but non-designated tracts, and a total of both. We see
that the overall statistics for the designated and non-designated Zones are fairly
comparable, but there is room for improvement. In an attempt to establish a
stronger control group, we used propensity score matching (explained in further
detail in the next section of this paper) to select eligible but non-designated
Zones that closely resemble the pre-designation trends of the designated Zones.
The trends of percent change in HPI are shown visually in the appendix.
Table 2 further shows how the designated and eligible but non-designated
tracts compare to one another. The columns show summary statistics for a variety of demographic characteristics for designated and eligible but non-designated
census tracts prior to the policy change. Specifically, this data is from the 2010
Census and is provided by the Urban Institute dataset.
The first column shows the averages for all the tracts eligible for Opportunity
Zone designation. The second and third columns in this table give us a clear
picture of how the zones differed from one another prior to treatment and further
show the potential benefit to propensity score matching in our analysis rather
than simply using eligible but non-designated census tracts as our control group.
Looking at the two groups broadly we see that while the designated and eligible
but non-designated tracts appear to be somewhat similar, it is evident that
designated tracts were, in general, more economically distressed. Overall, we
can see that designated zones display higher levels of signs of economic distress
such as poverty, unemployment, and severe rent burden as well as lower levels
of median income, median home value, and home ownership when compared to
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all eligible but non-designated Zones.
The fourth column shows the summary statistics for the matched control
group. We observe that for some covariates, the matched tracts are much more
similar to the designated tracts prior to treatment. Particularly, median home
value and median rent are much more similar in the match sample.

4

Empirical Strategy

To determine the effect of Opportunity Zone designation on single family house
pricing, we used a difference in difference empirical approach with three varying
strategies. For our initial analysis we look at eligible but non-designated zones
as a control group and consider 2018 to be the treatment year. The general
difference in difference equation we use for our analysis for census tract c in
state s at time t is
%∆hpicst = α0 + α1 (1 ∗ designatedcst ) + βt Xi + δc + θt + ucst
where designated is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a tract was
designated as an Opportunity Zone in 2018.
The parameter of interest is α1 , which represents the difference-in-difference
estimate. Since we do not observe covariates at the census tract level that vary
over time, we include tract level time-invariant covariates that are interacted
with each year. This allows us to have tract-by-year level controls. Particularly, we include median household income, percentage of the population that is
white, percentage of population with at least a bachelor’s degree, poverty rate,
unemployment rate, percent of the population over the age of 64, median rent,
and the proportion of the population under a severe rent burden. In the model,
the parameter δc accounts for tract fixed effect, θt accounts for time fixed effect,
and ucst is an unobserved term specific to the tract that effects the outcome. We
cluster our standard errors at the tract level to allow for common unobserved
shocks to correlate at the tract level.
It may be the case that using all eligible LIC tract that were non-designated
as controls does not give us a counterfactual group for our analysis. To possibly
correct for this, we construct a control group using logit propensity score nearest
neighbor matching procedure. To employ this method, we run a logistic regression (results displayed in appendix) that predicts the likelihood of treatment, or
the probability that each tract in our data (designated or non-designated) was
chosen for Opportunity Zone designation based on the same covariates listed
above and included in the initial model. We then use these likelihoods, or
propensity scores, and compare them between the groups to match each designated tract with an eligible but non-designated tract that displayed similar
characteristics prior to the 2018 treatment. In addition to ensuring that designated tracts are matched with the most similar eligible but non-designated
tracts, using a propensity score match allows us to better account for any unobservable and/or systematic differences that might exist between the designated
and eligible but non-designated tracts at the mean level.
9

Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Results
DiD Estimate
Number of Observations
Year Fixed Effects
Tract Fixed Effects
Covariates

Year ≤ 2018
(1)
(2)
0.1836
0.0458
(0.2236) (0.2270)
48,344
48,204
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Year ≤ 2019
(3)
(4)
0.2671
0.1208
(0.1418) (0.1414)
60,430
60,255
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Year ≤ 2020
(5)
(6)
0.2094
0.0768
(0.1210) (0.1184)
72,516
72,306
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Year ≤ 2021
(7)
(8)
0.1727
0.0093
(0.1151) (0.1105)
84,602
84,357
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the tract level, are presented in parentheses. Covariates included are median household income, percentage of the population that is white, percentage of
population with at least a bachelor’s degree, poverty rate, unemployment rate, percent of the population over the age of 64, median rent, and the proportion of the population under a severe rent
burden.
*0.10, **0.05 and ***0.01 denote significance levels.

5

Results

Our main results, displayed in Table 3, suggest no significant impact of OZ
designation on changes in the HPI.1 Each set of two columns provides estimated
differences between designated and eligible but non-designated Zones for one
additional year in our analysis (2014-2018, 2014-2019, 2014-2020, and 20142021). Odd columns represent a base difference in difference model and even
columns represent estimates for models that include the covariates mentioned
in Section 4.
The coefficients returned from our model suggest that, in 2018, the year
Opportunity Zones were designated, the percent change in single family house
prices within selected tracts was, on average, 0.05 percentage points higher
than that of tracts which were eligible but not designated. When the model is
expanded to include the years 2014-2019, the cumulative positive effect seems to
rise as house prices in selected tracts grew by a total of 0.12 percentage points
more than those in eligible but non-designated tracts. From here, the effect
appears to taper off; when we include data from 2014-2020, the results show a
cumulative difference of an additional 0.08 percentage point increase and, when
including all 8 years of data (from 2014 to 2021), the coefficient suggests that
house prices in Opportunity Zones only grew, on average, by an additional 0.01
percentage points since Opportunity Zones went into effect in 2018. When we
do not account for the differences in the covariates, the analysis instead shows a
much larger overall effect on single-family house prices as a result of designation.
All of these coefficients are statistically not different from zero and small in
magnitude, similar to the results Chen (2019) found when looking at the effect
of Zone designation in the first year after treatment. Our result for the effect
of designation on the percent change in HPI for the year of 2018 is around 0.10
1 Results shown in Table 3 are not particularly sensitive to using different dependent variables. When we use log(HPI) or delta log(HPI) as our dependent variable, the results are
smaller in magnitude and show slightly more statistical significance.
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Table 4: Matched Difference-in-Difference Results

DiD Estimate
Number of Observations

Year ≤ 2018
(1)
-0.0598
(0.2442)
9,708

Year ≤ 2019
(2)
-0.0646
(0.1846)
12,135

Year ≤ 2020
(3)
-0.2288
(0.1577)
14,562

Year ≤ 2021
(4)
-0.2011
(0.1485)
16,989

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the tract level, are presented in parenthese.
*0.10, **0.05 and ***0.01 denote significance levels.

percentage points different from the result in Chen (2019) and the standard
error is different by 0.002 percentage points.
Our next analysis followed the same structure as the first but used logit
propensity score nearest neighbor matching (based on the covariates included
in the prior analysis and outlined in Section 4) to select specific eligible but nondesignated tracts that may provide a stronger control group than the previous
method. The results for this analysis are shown in Table 4.2 We find that
using the propensity score matching approach also points to a null result on
the impact of Opportunity Zone designation. The estimates in the table below
imply that the year Zones were designated, selected Zones saw single family
home price growth of 0.06 percentage points less compared to eligible but nondesignated tracts. The cumulative effect became -0.065 percentage points when
we added the following year’s data (2014-2019) and then grew to a cumulative
-0.23 percentage points when we added 2020’s data. Lastly, the total treatment
affect, when looking at data from 2014 to 2021, culminates at -0.20 percentage
points. None of these results are statistically significant.
Again, similar to Chen (2019)’s results from analyzing the immediate effect,
we find no evidence that there has been a strong positive or negative effect on
house prices as a result of Opportunity Zone designation in the program’s first
four years.

6

Conclusion

The Opportunity Zones program is the largest scale of its kind this century and
thus imposes a huge cost to the United States government. Evaluating the effect
of such a program is crucial and will continue to be as the policy plays out over
the next decade. Our results find that after over four years of the policy being in
place, there is no evidence that designated Zones have seen significantly different
growth in single-family house prices when compared to eligible Census tracts
2 The results in this table are very sensitive to changes in the dependent variable. When we
use log(HPI) we find that estimates are larger in magnitude and all are statistically significant
at the 1% level. The final cumulative result when we use log(HPI) becomes 0.2651. When
we use delta log(HPI), estimates are much smaller in magnitude than those that are returned
from the log(HPI) model but they remain more statistically significant than the results shown
in Table 4.
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with similar characteristics that were not selected. Although these results are
still looking at the relatively short-term effects of Zone designation, they may
provide a pessimistic outlook for the program’s efficacy in the coming years.
There is more work to be done before discounting Opportunity Zones as a
waste. It is important to note that policy implications surrounding any effect
on or changes in quality of life as a result of being a designated Zone are outside
of the scope of this paper. As outlined in Oakley & Tsao (2006), it is critical to
ensure that any improvements as a result of economic development initiatives go
beyond economic indicators like housing prices. Future research should be done
to look into whether or not citizens living in designated Opportunity Zones saw
a change in quality of life as measured by unemployment rates, poverty rates,
crime rates, etc. Our hope is that an analysis such as this will become possible
as more 2020 Census data is released. Furthermore, as time goes on it will be
important to continue to observe the performance of Opportunity Zones and
compare this place-based economic program to similar government programs
implemented in the past. Analyses regarding the impact of this program are
likely to be used to inform policy on future economic development efforts.
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Table 5: PS Match Logit Regression Results
(1)
Designated
Median Household Income

-0.0000154∗∗∗
(0.00000394)

Median Home Value

0.00000153∗∗∗
(0.000000312)

Percent White

0.00218
(0.00113)

Percent with BA or Higher

-0.00876∗∗∗
(0.00237)

Poverty Rate

0.0347∗∗∗
(0.00407)

Unemployment Rate

0.0242∗∗∗
(0.00582)

Percent Over 64

0.00689
(0.00452)
-0.000546∗∗∗
(0.000166)

Median Rent

Percent Under Severe Rent Burden

-0.00564∗
(0.00276)

Constant

-1.406∗∗∗
(0.254)
12051
0.038

Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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